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Abstract
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1Non-technical Summary
Dollarization of liabilities in the corporate sector characterizes many emerging or transition
economies. It has proven to be potentially destabilizing, as for example in the recent Asian
crisis. Addressing the issues raised by such a phenomenon requires …rst to investigate …rst the
emergence of private foreign currency debt. The present paper questions intermediated dollar
indebtedness by …rms of the non-tradable goods sectors in a period of exchange rate pressure.
The setting is a simple game-theoretic model with three dates. In a small open economy we
consider relationships between a bank and …rms. The former’s liabilities are made up of one unit
of the tradable good, whose price at the intermediary date is random. The bank can choose
to lend one unit of tradable or non-tradable good. Firms need one unit of good (whatever its
nature) to start an investment project, which can be either good or poor. A poor project requires
to be rolled over at the intermediary date to be completed. The liquidation policy of the bank
depends, on the one hand, on the currency denomination of loans and, on the other hand, on
the value of nominal and real exchange rates. A dollar loan allows banks to preserve the real
value of their claims, but is riskier. However, because of the guarantee of its external debt, the
bank may choose to grant dollar loans under conditions that are speci…ed. The bank’s strategy
depends especially on the average quality of projects in the economy: The lower the proportion
of good projects in the economy, the proner the bank will be to lend tradable goods instead of
non-tradable goods. As far as …rms are concerned a dollar loan may allow them to bene…t from
a higher probability of facing a soft budget constraint. Firms’ preferences are determined by
the average quality of projects that represents the probability of having a good project and the
private bene…t the entrepreneurs extract from managing their project.
Then, the model is modi…ed to focus on banks-government relationships and analyses pruden-
tial regulation under dollarization of liabilities in non-tradable goods sectors. A cost-minimizing
government is allowed to manipulate the real exchange rate, through the price of the non-tradable
good. It can under particular circumstances lower the expected costs of banks rescue if rolled
over poor projects fail. The negative counterpart is that it may be constrained in its ability to
implement an e¢cient prudential policy because of a higher probability of facing a too many to
fail situation as de…ned by Mitchell (1998).
21 Introduction
Private short-term foreign currency debts have played a central role in most recent emerging
market crises. In East Asian countries, observers stressed the importance of short-term for-
eign currency outstanding debt both in corporate and banking sectors. The corporate sector
borrowed in foreign currencies either directly from international investors or through domestic
…nancial intermediaries as, for example, in Indonesia; banks usually intermediate foreign capital
in‡ows because of a cost advantage over foreign lenders in observing the output realization of
domestic …rms. Moreover, …rms of both tradable and non-tradable goods sectors contracted
dollar denominated debt. The riskiness of such a choice is more striking in the latter case, for
which real estate provides a good example, since …rms’ earnings and debts are not denominated
in the same currency. Firms might be very vulnerable to exchange rate depreciation. Finan-
cial intermediaries also borrowed heavily in hard foreign currencies, typically the dollar or the
yen, to grant domestic or foreign currency loans to …nance domestic activities of …rms. The BIS
(1998) reported that in 1995 and 1996 banks of …ve Asian countries (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand and the Philippines) borrowed $43 billions per year. Foreign currency debts accounted
for up to thirty percent of banks liabilities. In a context of insu¢cient and ine¢cient prudential
regulation, this led to high and certainly excessive investment in Asian economies. Corsetti et
al., (1999, p1230-31) notice that “…nancial intermediation played a key role in channeling funds
toward projects that were marginal if not outright unpro…table”. Eventually, when the crisis
occurred, resulting balance sheet mismatches both in corporate and banking sectors contributed
to a deepening of the Asian crisis, and to a greater di¢culty to manage this crisis (see e.g., BIS,
1998 or Jeanne, 2000).
Despite these destabilizing e¤ects, little inquiry has concerned the emergence of intermedi-
ated dollar denominated debt in non-tradable goods sectors so far. The BIS (1998) noticed that
…xed or quasi-…xed pegs maintained on a long period might have led economic agents to a false
assessment of exchange rate risk.1 On the other hand, few analyses are based on the idea that
foreign currency indebtedness could be justi…ed by private bene…ts for agents.
1Moreover, this mistake could have been strengthened by an ”inverse money illusion”, the agents reasoning in
terms on interest rates of US dollars or yen corrected by domestic in‡ation. This occurs when a …xed exchange
rate regime is associated with high interest rate and high in‡ation. Residents are encouraged to borrow in foreign
currency to …nance domestic activity or domestic asset purchases, especially real estate in the Asian example (see
BIS, 1998).
3Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) point out that …xing the exchange rate o¤ers free
insurance to …rms which borrow in dollar. Caballero and Krishnamurty (2000) stress the role
of foreign currency liabilities as an insurance against a shortage of external resources, assumed
necessary for production. International …nancial constraints of developing countries justify the
purchase of such an insurance. Moreover, they show that both domestic …nancial system under-
development and limited domestic collateral of …rms explain that …rms systematically undervalue
insurance provided by local currency debt against countrywide shocks. In a model with foreign
lenders but no banks, Schneider and Tornell (2000) show that …rms of the non-tradable goods
sectors may choose a dollar denominated debt to switch a part of their expected debt burden
to foreign creditors, if the realization of the real exchange rate turns out to be unfavorable. A
…rm that does not meet its debt burden at the expected date is liquidated. Hence, they cannot
capture wide “evergreening” practices, which seem have been a general feature of banking in
the East Asian experience (see e.g., Caprio and Honohan, 1999).
Caballero and Krishnamurty assume that each loan is fully collateralized with assets denom-
inated in the loan denomination currency; their model allows no default on debt. Schneider and
Tornell suppose the immediate liquidation of a …rm, when it cannot repay its …nancial obliga-
tions. On the contrary, the present paper proposes an explanation based on banks liquidation
policy with respect to defaulting loans and is related to soft budget constraint theories. In
this analytical framework, …rms’ creditors cannot commit not to re…nance -or to roll over- a
project not completed at the expected date. Kornai (1980) introduced the concept of soft bud-
get constraint focusing on political motivations. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) stressed the
ex-post pro…tability of a re…nanced project in the presence of irreversibilities. The soft budget
constraint phenomenon can occur even if re…nancing the poor project is ex-post ine¢cient. In
Mitchell’s analysis (Mitchell, 1998), …rms’ budget constraints are soften because banks gamble
for resurrection or attempt to trigger a too many to fail.2
We retain the latter approach in this paper to analyze dollarization of liabilities before an
exchange rate and/or a banking crisis occurs. We develop a simple model that extends this
framework in order to consider two stylized facts of banking in emerging countries. Firstly, as
already mentioned, a large part of commercial banks’ liabilities is denominated in hard foreign
currencies. Therefore, expected or observed exchange rate variations a¤ect banks’ balance sheets
2Dewatripont and Roland (2000) or Maskin and Xu (2001) provide recent surveys of soft budget constraint
theories.
4on the liabilities side and may change their incentives. Secondly, the government, often supported
by international organizations, guaranties external debt of banks, especially in order to maintain
access to international capital markets. Such an insurance is typically associated with the
abandonment of an exchange rate peg. Empirical evidence supports this as shown for example
by Hawkins and Turner (1999) or Corsetti et al. (1999). This means that banks bene…t from a
limited liability, which is here the origin of a moral hazard problem. They choose a risky asset
(here they roll over a defaulting loan) with a high return if the gamble succeeds, but leave it to
the government if the gamble fails.
Section 2 presents the model of bank-…rms relationship and shows that liquidation policy of
banks depends on the one hand, on the currency denomination of loans and on the other hand on
the value of nominal and real exchange rates. A dollar loan allows banks to preserve the real value
of their claims but is riskier. However, because of the guarantee of their external debt, banks
may choose to grant dollar loans under conditions that are speci…ed. Banks’ strategy depends
especially on the average quality of projects in the economy. As far as …rms are concerned, a
dollar loan may allow them to bene…t from a higher probability of facing a soft budget constraint.
Once again, …rms preferences are determined by the average quality of projects that represents
the probability of having a good project.
In section 3, the model is modi…ed to focus on banks-government relationships and analyses
prudential regulation under dollarization of liabilities in non-tradable goods sectors. The analysis
relies on the concept of too many to fail. Such a situation occurs when closing down a large
number of insolvent banks is more costly than rescuing them. We show that a cost-minimizing
government might manipulate the real exchange rate to lower the costs of rescue. The negative
counterpart is that it might be constrained in its ability to implement an e¢cient prudential
policy. Section 4 presents …nal remarks and an appendix follows.
2 Foreign debt guarantee and soft budget constraints
2.1 General framework
Consider a simple model of a small open economy.3 There are three periods t = 0;1;2. The
discount rate is zero. There are two perfectly divisible goods in the economy. The …rst one is a
3The model considers domestic currency denominated variables. Using the tradable good as a numeraire does
not a¤ect any result derived here.
5non-tradable good whose related variables are denoted with subscript N; its domestic currency
price is pN. The second one is an internationally tradable good4 denoted with subscript T;
its domestic currency price pT is a random variable which at t = 1 takes on a range of values
pT;a;pT;d;pT;d, with respective (positive) probabilities ¹a;¹d;¹d. We have
X
i=a;d;d
¹i = 1
This distribution is common knowledge. There is no change in the price of the tradable good
between t = 1 and t = 2. We also assume that at t = 0, pT = pN. It means that the real exchange
rate, de…ned as the relative price of the tradable good in terms of the non-tradable good
pT
pN , is
equal to 1 at the beginning of the game. Then, pT;a;pT;d and pT;d correspond respectively to a
decrease (a nominal appreciation), a small increase (a small nominal depreciation) and a high
increase (a high nominal depreciation) of pT. The same analysis holds with devaluation in the
case of …xed or quasi-…xed exchange rate regime; in this case, ¹d and ¹d express the probability
of the abandonment of the peg. The values of pT;a, pT;d and pT;d will be clari…ed later.
2.1.1 The domestic productive sector
There are F identical (risk neutral) entrepreneurs, with F normalized to 1. Each entrepreneur
is endowed with an investment project, that concerns the non-tradable good. There are two
types of project (we identify the quality of a project with that of its entrepreneur). It is good
i.e. completed in one period with probability ®. Then, it yields a gross return pNYN where YN
denotes …rm’s output. The gross return of the project is not a¤ected by the price of the tradable
good. With probability 1¡®, the project is poor. It yields no output after one period and leads
the entrepreneur to default on its loan at t = 1. A poor project may be completed in the second
period provided that the loan is rolled over. However, it yields a random production e YN with
e YN 2 [0;YN]. The distribution (®;1 ¡ ®) is common knowledge but an entrepreneur does not
know her type at the outset of the game.
The project needs equivalently either one unit of non-tradable good or one unit of tradable
good to be started. An entrepreneur has no endowment herself at period 0. So she has to
4The country is assumed to be price taker in the world market for importables and exportables. Therefore the
terms of trade are exogenously given. Since we do not need to distinguish between exportables and importables,
we can aggregate them into a composite commodity called tradable goods whose price (in dollar) is exogenously
determined and supposed constant in this model.
6obtain …nancing, i.e. one unit of good, from the bank. She may ask for one unit of non-tradable
good (a domestic currency loan) or for one unit of tradable good (a foreign currency loan,
typically a dollar denominated loan). The …rst one imposes, at t = 1, a repayment obligation
D 2 [0;pNYN[. The second one imposes a repayment obligation, which depends on the value
of the price of the tradable good. It may be D(pT;a), D(pT;d) or D(pT;d), henceforth denoted
DT;a, DT;d and DT;d for simplicity. Following our assumptions on tradable good prices, we have
DT;a < DN < DT;d < DT;d. The entrepreneurs’ objective function can be generally expressed as
ª = maxfpNYN ¡ D;0g +e b (1)
An entrepreneur receives the net return of the project pNYN ¡ DN or pNYN ¡ DT;i for
i 2
©
a;d;d
ª
if positive; in fact, we will assume that pNYN > DT;d .5 It means that entrepreneurs
bene…t from a limited liability. In addition to that monetary pro…t, an entrepreneur has a private
bene…te b if she retains her position. More speci…cally, she retains her private bene…t if her project
is good or if her project is poor and rolled over (then e b = b; otherwise e b = 0).
2.1.2 The bank
The characterization of the bank borrows from Mitchell (1998). It has no initial capital. Then,
the bank’s liabilities can be expressed as
dNpN + dTp
(0)
T (2)
where dNpN is the non-tradable good debt, dTp
(0)
T the tradable goods debt vis-à-vis external
investors and p
(0)
T the price of the tradable good at the outset of the game. Debts have to be
repaid at the end of the game. For the sake of analytical simplicity, we assume that dN is zero
and dT is equal to 1. Then bank’s liabilities are equal to p
(0)
T . Bank’s liabilities are completely
made up of an external debt that amounts to the value of one unit of tradable good. The
important assumption is the guarantee of bank’s external debt in tradable good. We assume
that the government6 pays back foreign lenders if the bank’s end of game net position is negative.
5More speci…cally, it means that if YN is realised, it allows an entrepreneur to pay its loan back. This
assumption appears realistic since we investigate periods of exchange rate pressure and not the crisis itself. When
the Asian crisis occured, devaluation of Asian currency were generally very large (for example, 75% in Indonesia);
in such a case, even an entrepreneur endowed with a good project is likely to be driven into insolvency.
6The government is a passive player in this section.
7As far as bank’s assets are concerned, the bank can choose to lend either one unit of non-
tradable good or one unit of tradable good (we implicitly assume that the bank can exchange
one unit of tradable good for one unit of non-tradable good without incurring costs at t = 0). It
is also assumed that the bank charges each loan with the same real interest rate r: Interest rates
issues are obviously important issues to understand borrowing and lending choice respectively
of …rms and banks. However, we focus here on another aspect of the problem. Let us consider
each loan denomination in turn.
Firstly, the bank chooses to grant a non-tradable good loan. If the project turns out to
be good, the loan is completely repaid. The return is DN. When the bank faces default at
intermediary period (i.e. the project is poor), it can choose either a tough liquidation policy or
a soft liquidation policy. We will equivalently refer to a tough liquidation policy or imposing
a hard budget constraint (HBC) and to a soft liquidation policy or imposing a soft budget
constraint (SBC).
In the case of a tough policy, the bank receives a liquidation value L (with L > 0) which
expresses the value of an entrepreneur’s collateral. As IMF noticed concerning …nancial interme-
diation in East Asia, banks lending practices have relied on collateral rather than credit assess-
ment and cash-‡ow analysis. Yet, on the one hand, collaterals were generally overvalued and on
the other hand, di¢culties in seizing and realizing a collateral reduce its value. A soft liquidation
policy means “evergreening” the loan; it is rolled over without being reclassi…ed (hence, the bank
makes no provision) and without any consideration of project restructuring. Let suppose that
there is no change in the nature, non-tradable or tradable, of the borrowed good. In that case,
the project will succeed with probability q that can be written as qN = PrfpN e YN¡pN(1+r) ¸ 0g
or equivalently qN = Prfe YN ¡(1+r) ¸ 0g.7 The price of the non-tradable good does not a¤ect
the probability of repayment of a rolled over loan. The expected return of the loan is qNDN. Let
us assume that DN > L > qNDN. Furthermore, when a rolled over poor project fails that is the
realized output does not allow the …rm to repay its debt, whatever the nature of the borrowed
good, it yields for the bank at t = 2, an end-of-game liquidation value l normalized to zero.
Hence, the soft budget constraint phenomenon arises because a poor project whose liquidation
value is greater than its continuation value is not terminated.
Secondly, the bank chooses to grant a tradable good loan. The expected repayment depends
7Ex-post, a poor project that succeeds may be seen as an illiquid one whereas a poor project that fails may
be seen as an insolvent one.
8on the price of the tradable good. For example, an increase (a nominal depreciation) may have
two e¤ects. The …rst one is an increase in the claim value. As stated before, the debt has in such
a case, two possible outcomes DT;d and DT;d. Depreciation means symmetrically an increase
of entrepreneurs’ debt burden while the value of their assets remains unchanged. Therefore we
assume that the probability of repayment of a rolled over loan is decreasing in the value of the
tradable good price.8 It is worth noting that the probability of repayment can be expressed as
qT;i = PrfpN e YN ¡ pT;i(1 + r) ¸ 0g or qT;i = Prfe YN ¡
pT;i
pN (1 + r) ¸ 0g. The ability of the …rm
to repay its loan depends more on the real exchange rate
pT
pN than on the price of the tradable
good. The lower the real exchange rate, the higher the probability of repayment. In this version
of the model, since pN is given, both the nominal and the real exchange rates change in the
same way. This second e¤ect is captured by the following assumption: qN > qT;d > qT;d. As
previously, we assume that DT;i > L > qT;iDT;i for each value of i, that is liquidation is the
e¢cient ex-post policy.
2.1.3 The timing of the game
The timing of the game is as follows. At the outset of the game (t = 0), entrepreneurs choose
to apply for a non-tradable good loan or for a tradable good loan. Then, the bank decides to
grant non-tradable or tradable good loans. Only after contracting with the bank, entrepreneurs
uncover their types. At the intermediary period (t = 1), return of the projects are observed. The
bank also observes the value of the tradable good price. Then, it chooses action with respect to
poor projects. At the end of the game (t = 2), the return of rolled over projects are observed
and the bank is bailed out by the government if necessary. The game is of complete information
and is solved by backward induction.
8Generally, a decrease in banks expected assets, following a strong domestic currency depreciation, results from
the prospect of a bankruptcy wave in the productive sector especially due to slackening of economic growth, high
interest rates and a cut in bank intermediation. Regarding the latter point, Berglöf and Roland (1997) showed
that soft budget constraints can coexist with credit crunches.
92.2 Gambling banks and tradable goods loans
We start with the characterization of the bank’s strategy. The bank is assumed to be risk
neutral; it will choose the one which maximizes its expected pro…t.9 Since the bank’s liabilities
come due at the end of the game, its two-period earnings minus liabilities determine its solvency.
We consider both possible strategies in turn assuming, on the one hand, that …nancing the F
projects is ex-ante pro…table for the bank and on the other hand, that ®D < pT;i 8i 2 fa;d;dg.
Returns on good projects are not high enough to permit the bank to repay its debt.
First, the bank may choose to grant non-tradable good loans. The expected return of a
tough liquidation policy is W
liq
N = ®D + (1 ¡ ®)L ¡ pT;i. Funds ®DN + (1 ¡ ®)L are received
at t = 1 and invested in a safe asset whose return is normalized to zero. With respect to
a soft liquidation policy, because foreign debt guarantee provides a limited liability, the bank
expected return is Wroll
N = qN(DN ¡ pT;i). The incentive to gamble for resurrection is de…ned
by ¢WN = Wroll
N ¡ W
liq
N : Hence,
¢WN = (1 ¡ ®)(DN ¡ L) ¡ (1 ¡ qN)(DN ¡pT;i) (3)
Clearly, this expression increases with the price of the tradable good.10 The higher the tradable
good price, the higher entrepreneurs’ probability of facing a soft budget constraint. The bene…t
of a soft liquidation policy results from the fact that bank’s debt is only repaid with probability
q. An increase in the price of the tradable good strengthens the bias towards a soft liquidation
strategy resulting from the di¤erence between the expected repayment of bank’s debt and its
face value when the bank gambles for resurrection. Conversely, a decrease in the price of the
tradable good leads to a tougher liquidation policy. More precisely, the bank will choose a soft
liquidation policy if
pT ¸ DN ¡
(1 ¡®)(DN ¡ L)
1 ¡ qN
(4)
We assume that pT;d is de…ned by this condition and that pT;d is not high enough for bank to
become insolvent if it chooses a tough liquidation policy. Thus, the expected return (denoted
9Institutional advantages may have biased banks’ loans toward foreign currency loan. For example, the Philip-
pines experienced a signi…cant growth in foreign currency intermediation before the crisis occurs in part because
of full tax-exemption (IMF, 1999).
10Unsurprinsgly, the derivative of ¢WN with respect to the liquidation value L is negative. A high liquidation
value raises the opportuniy cost of rolling over poor projects. The same remark holds when the banks grants a
tradable good loan.
10E(WN)) of a bank, which chooses to grant non-tradable good loans, is
E(WN) = (¹a + ¹d)(®DN + (1 ¡ ®)L) + ¹dqN:DN ¡ ¹apT;a ¡ ¹dpT;d ¡ ¹dqNpT;d (5)
Then, the bank may choose to grant tradable good loans. As noted before, we have to
consider the consequence of tradable good’s price variations both on the value of the …rm’s debt
and on the probability of repayment of a rolled over loan. Remember that the bank knows
the …nal price of the tradable good. The return associated with each strategy may be written
as a general rule as in the …rst case. However, repayment and probability of success depend
on the tradable good price. So the incentive to soften the entrepreneurs’ budget constraints
(¢WT = Wroll
T ¡ W
liq
T ) can be written as
¢WT = (1 ¡ ®)(DT;i ¡ L) ¡ (1 ¡qT;i)(DT;i ¡ pT;i) (6)
where Wroll
T ;W
liq
T denote respectively the payo¤ of a strategy of soft or tough liquidation policy.
We now have to establish the consequence of a tradable good price variation on the incentive to
enforce a soft liquidation policy. It means to compute the derivative of the incentive to gamble
with respect to the price of the tradable good. From equation (6), one obtains
@(¢WT)
@pT
=
@qT;i
@pT
(DT ¡ pT) +
@DT
@pT
(qT;i ¡ ®) + (1 ¡ qT;i) (7)
An increase in the price of the tradable good will induce bank to implement a soft liquidation
policy if this expression is positive. The …rst term is negative (
@qT;i
@pT < 0 for pN given and
DT > pT). It represents the negative e¤ect on bank’s incentive to gamble due to the increase
in the probability of failure (because of the depreciation) of a poor rolled over project. The
sign of the second term depends on the sign of (qT;i ¡ ®). If qT;i > ®, this term indicates
the strengthening of the incentives to gamble related to the rise of the value of the potentially
recoverable claim. On the other hand, if qT;i < ®, the bank may choose a tough liquidation
policy. The last term stands for the debt e¤ect on the incentive to gamble. When it chooses a
soft liquidation policy, the expected value of bank’s debt is lower than its face value.
We assume that the overall expression is positive. Increase in the price of the tradable
good urges the bank to adopt a soft liquidation policy. The bank’s focus on the value of the
claim, rather than the probability of repayment, can justify this assumption. Actually, observers
stressed that in the case of Asian crisis, banks seem not to have taken into accounts the negative
relationship between the probability of repayment and the exchange-rate value, when lending in
11hard foreign currency (in our setting, it means that
@qT;i
@pT is equal or close to zero). They might
have believed they just had to balance their own foreign currency debt with foreign currency
loans to domestic …rms or households to …nance domestic activities (BIS, (1998); Caprio and
Honohan, (1999)). Finally, devaluation of Asian currencies has made the exchange rate risk
reappear as credit risk.
Let de…ne pT;a (with pT;a < pT) as a tradable good price such that the bank implements
a tough liquidation policy whatever the denomination currency of the loan. Then, de…ne pT;d
(with pT < pT;d) the tradable good price which corresponds to an increase in pT so high as to
lead the bank to choose a soft liquidation policy when granting a tradable good loan. We have
to check whether pT;d < pT;d. The following claim states this.
Claim 1 From the de…nitions of pT;d and pT;d, we have pT;d < pT;d if
qT;d ¸ 1 ¡
(1 ¡ qN)(1 ¡ ®)(DT;d ¡ L)
(1 ¡ qN)(DT;d ¡ DN) + (1 ¡ ®)(DN ¡ L)
(8)
From now on, we assume that the probability of repayment qT;d satis…es this condition. It
means that if qT;d is high enough , the necessary increase in the price of the tradable good to lead
the bank to soften entrepreneurs’ budget constraints is lower when the bank grants a tradable
good loan.
Therefore we are now able to establish the strategy of the bank when it grants a dollar loan.
It will implement a tough liquidation policy for pT = pT;a and a soft liquidation policy otherwise.
Its expected payo¤ is thus ®DT;a+(1¡®)L¡pT;a if pT = pT;a, and qT;i(DT;i¡pT;i) for i = d;d.
We have
E(WT) = ¹a(®DT;a + (1 ¡ ®)L ¡ pT;a) + ¹dqT;d(DT;d ¡ pT;d) + ¹dqT;d(DT;d ¡pT;d) (9)
The bank is going to accept a tradable good loan if its expected payo¤ is higher than the expected
payo¤ associated with a non-tradable good loan. That is if E(WT) ¸ E(WN). Rewriting this
condition, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If equation (8) is satis…ed, then the bank chooses to grant a tradable good loan
if
¹d
£
qT;d(DT;d ¡ pT;d) ¡ (®DN + (1 ¡ ®)L ¡ pT;d)
¤
+¹d
h
qT;d(DT;d ¡ pT;d) ¡ qN(DN ¡ pT;d)
i
(10)
¸ ¹a®(DN ¡ DT;a)
12The …rst term indicates the expected earnings of a soft liquidation policy in the case of a low
depreciation (pT = pT;d). The second term represents potential earnings resulting from a soft
liquidation policy in the case of a strong depreciation (pT = pT;d). In fact, the sign of this term
is di¢cult to assess because DT;d ¡ pT;d > DN ¡pT;d and qT;d < qN. The third term represents
the loss of pro…t associated to good projects when there is an appreciation in the price of the
tradable good. From basic comparative static, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 3 The lower the proportion of good projects in the economy, the proner the bank will
be to lend tradable goods instead of non-tradable goods.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Ones compute the derivative of equation (10) with
respect to ®: One obtains ¡¹d(DN ¡ L) ¡ ¹a(DN ¡ DT;a) which is negative
The guarantee of its external debt provides the bank with an implicit subsidy, which increases
with credit risk. Then, if the former is high, it leads banks to take on more risk through tradable
good loans. We now question …rms’ possibility to take advantage of this.
2.3 Why do entrepreneurs borrow the tradable good?
The model allows no bargaining power to the …rm on the choice of the nature of the borrowed
good. So this section aims at characterizing entrepreneurs preferences.11 The important point
here is that entrepreneurs do not know their type when they ask the bank for a non-tradable
or a tradable good loan. An entrepreneur only knows the distribution (® ;1 ¡ ®) of good
and poor projects in the economy. Consider the two possibilities in turn. Borrowing a non-
tradable good is the …rst possibility. If her project is good, an entrepreneur’s expected payo¤
is ªN = (pNYN ¡ DN) + b 8pT 2 fpT;a;pT;d;pT;dg. Considering the structure of its liabilities,
the bank will implement a soft liquidation policy only if pT = pT;d, which may be the case with
probability ¹d. If her project is poor, her expected payo¤ is ¹d(qN(pNYN ¡DN)+b). Thus, her
total expected payo¤ is
E(ªN) = ®((pNYN ¡ DN) + b) + (1 ¡ ®)¹d(qN(pNYN ¡ DN) + b) (11)
The alternative is a tradable good loan. If her project is good, her expected payo¤ is (pNYN ¡
DT;i)+b with i 2 f1;2;3g. If her project is poor, her expected payo¤ is zero if pT = pT;a because
11One should also have considered that …rms bene…t from bargaining power (considering for example large
capital in‡ows and competitive pressure on banks in East Asia). In such a case, the …nal characterization of the
equilibrium will change but the analyzis of …rms’ strategies is altered, what is our point.
13she faces a hard budget constraint, and qT;i(pNYN ¡ DT;i) + b if pT = pT;i for i = d;d, because
she has a soft budget constraint. Thus, an entrepreneur’s total expected payo¤ is
E(ªT) = ®(pNYN ¡ ¹aDT;a ¡ ¹dDT;d ¡ ¹dDT;d +b) (12)
+(1 ¡ ®)(¹dqT;d(pNYN ¡ DT;d) + ¹dqT;d(pNYN ¡DT;d) + (¹d + ¹d)b)
Entrepreneurs will choose a tradable good debt if E(ªT) ¸ E(ªN). Consequently, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 Entrepreneurs will ask for tradable good loans if
®:¹a(DN ¡ DT;a) + (1 ¡ ®)[¹d(qT;d(pNYN ¡ DT;d) + b] ¸
®[¹d(DT;d ¡ DN) +¹d(DT;d ¡DN)] (13)
+(1 ¡®)¹d[qN (pNYN ¡ DN) ¡ qT;d(pNYN ¡ DT;d)]
Recall that a decrease in the price of the tradable good leads the bank to harden the …rm’s
budget constraint whatever good is the loan denominated. Then, the …rst term of left-hand
side represents the pro…t related to tradable good denominated debt if the project is good and
in the same time, the price of the tradable good decreases. It expresses the cut in …rms’ debt.
The second term indicates the payo¤ due to the distortion of the bank’s balance sheet which
consequence is that a lower price of the tradable good allows the entrepreneur to have a soft
budget constraint. The probability of facing a soft budget constraint is now ¹d + ¹d. It means
that she retains at least her private bene…t.
The right hand side of (13) only concerns monetary costs. The …rst term stands for the loss
of pro…t resulting from an increase in the tradable good price if the project is good. Finally, the
second term may express the monetary loss associated to a poor project if there is a high price
of the tradable good (pT = pT;d), but the …rm’s manager retains her non-monetary bene…t b.
Hence, the right hand side of (13) stands for the monetary cost of a better -partial- insurance
against early liquidation of a poor project. Consequently, we can establish the following.
Corollary 5 If the private non-monetary bene…t of entrepreneurs is high enough, i.e.
b ¸ b b =
¹d
¹d
h
qN(pNYN ¡ DN) ¡ qT;d(pNYN ¡ DT;d)
i
(14)
¡qT;d(pNYN ¡ DT;d) ¡ (DT;d ¡ DN) ¡
¹d
¹d
(DT;d ¡ DN) +
¹a
¹d
(DN ¡DT;a)
14Then the higher the proportion of poor projects in the economy, the proner entrepreneurs will
be to borrow tradable goods.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. One computes the derivative of equation (13) with
respect to ®. One obtains
¡¹d
£
qT;d(pNYN ¡ DT;d) + b
¤
¡¹d
h
qN(pNYN ¡ DN) ¡ qT;d(pNYN ¡ DT;d)
i
(15)
+¹a(DN ¡DT;a) ¡ ¹d(DT;d ¡ DN) ¡ ¹d(DT;d ¡ DN)
Which is negative for the value presented in equation (14)
This result appears consistent with Schneider and Tornell’s analysis (Schneider and Tornell,
2000, p21). They found, in a di¤erent setting, that as far as …rms are concerned, “undertaking
risky plans goes hand in hand with a preference for debt denominated in tradables”.
Finally, it remains to precise the nature of the loan. It is possible to determine from propo-
sition 1 and 2 cut-o¤ levels of ®, the probability that a project be good. Denote b ®b, b ®f the
cut-o¤ levels respectively for the bank and entrepreneurs. If ® · b ®b and ® · b ®f, then the bank
grants the tradable good loan, entrepreneurs applied for. The realization of the tradable good
price and eventually of a rolled over project determines payo¤s. If ® > b ®b and ® · b ®f, then
entrepreneurs would like to ask for a tradable good loan but the bank would turn down. It
just would be willing to grant a non-tradable good loan. Assumptions on entrepreneurs’ private
bene…t ensure that the project is undertaken since E(ªN) is positive while not undertaking
the project yields a payo¤ equal to zero. If ® · b ®b and ® > b ®f, the issue is quite unusual.
Entrepreneurs would prefer to ask for a non-tradable good loan. However the bank would only
accept to grant a tradable good loan.12 At last, if ® > b ®b and ® > b ®f, entrepreneurs apply for
a non-tradable good loan and the bank accepts.
3 Prudential policy under dollarization of liabilities
Two main reasons explain excessive risk taking that occurred after the …nancial liberalization
in East Asia (Mishkin, 1999). The …rst one was the lack of banks’ managers of the expertise to
12Allowing the bargaining power to …rms will obviously lead to opposite issues (in terms of the borrowed good)
when the two parties have di¤erent preferences on the nature of the loan.
15manage risk appropriately. The second ones was the inadequacy of the regulatory/supervisory
policy. Together with depositors and foreign lenders protection, it generated moral hazard as
for example described in the preceding section. Then, this section will discuss the capacity of
the government to implement e¢cient regulatory and supervisory policies when …rms in the
non-tradable good sector borrow tradable goods. The discussion of regulatory and supervisory
policies under dollarization of liabilities relies on Mitchell’s analysis (Mitchell, 1998) who in-
troduced the concept of too many to fail to account for large levels of creditor passivity with
respect to defaulting loans in transition countries.
Let consider a sketch of Mitchell’s model13. Banks and the government interact in a two-
stage game. The latter aims at cutting the costs resulting from the existence of non-performing
loans under the constraint that foreign creditors be repaid at the end of the game. It is assumed
to be cost-minimizing as in Mailath and Mester (1994). Payout to foreign lenders and costs of
closing the banks constitute these costs.
Consider the preceding model with banks granting tradable good loans. Ex-ante i.e. at t = 0,
the government is assumed to know the proportion of good projects in the economy, ®, and the
number m of banks with poor projects in their portfolio (the share is 1 ¡ ®). Furthermore,
the government has …xed a high monitoring capacity, incurring a …x cost K. At t = 1, after
banks have chosen their policy, it is able to identify all banks which have implemented a soft
liquidation policy with respect to defaulting loans. Then, it has to choose the ex-post policy it
will implement. At t = 2, poor projects are realized and the government repay foreign lenders
if necessary. Since there are more changes in prices than in the preceding sections, we introduce
superscripts when necessary to denote the date of realization.
The …rst ex-post policy may be “closure”. Banks having chosen a soft liquidation policy
are closed down, poor projects are forced into bankruptcy (allowing the government to recover
liquidation value of these projects) and banks’ payo¤ is zero. The government entails both
direct costs (administrative costs) and indirect costs due to disruptions in the domestic …nancial
system. As in Mitchell’s model, the total cost, denoted c(m) is assumed to be convex in the
number of closed banks. “Neutral forbearance” is the alternative policy. It means recapitalizing
banks if poor rolled over projects fails and whatever the issue of the projects leaving banks
13We simply discuss here the possibility of occurrence of a too many to fail situation. The demonstration of
consequences on monitoring capacity of the government requires a more formal model. Since it is very close to
Mitchell, we leave it in the appendix.
16open. The recapitalization is such that the …nal wealth of banks is zero. Therefore the expected
cost is mRmin where Rmin denotes the expected cost of recapitalization per banks, Rmin =
m
¡
1 ¡ q(2)¢h
p
(2)
T ¡ ®D
(2)
T
i
and the expected payo¤ of banks is positive.
A too many to fail occurs if closing down a large number of …nancially distressed banks is
more costly than recapitalizing them, that is if
c(m) ¸ m
³
1 ¡ q(2)
´h
p
(2)
T ¡ ®D
(2)
T
i
(16)
Mitchell shows that in such a case, an ex-ante tough prudential policy is not an issue because sub-
game perfection would be violated. The prudential policy is soften through weaker monitoring
capacity ex-ante or through ex-post recapitalization.
To account for the evolution of exchange rates in East Asian countries before the crises
occurred, that is a trend of slight nominal depreciation (sometimes owing to a crawling peg
arrangement) and real appreciation (see e.g. IMF, 1999, …g 3, p 16), we now allow the gov-
ernment to manipulate the non-tradable good price after having observed both the price of the
tradable good and the behavior of banks. Let assume that the price of the non-tradable good
does not change between t = 0 and t = 1 and that the end-of-game non-tradable good price
may be either pN or pN with pN < pN. Yet, manipulating the non-tradable good price may now
alter the price of the tradable good through a rise of the nominal exchange rate. Hence, it is
supposed that
p
(2)
T = p
(1)
T + ±(p
(2)
N ¡p
(1)
N ) (17)
where 0 · ±.14 Moreover, we assume that ± · ± ´
p
(1)
T
p
(1)
N
. This assumption ensures that if the
realization of the price of the tradable good consists in a nominal depreciation high enough to
induce banks to roll over defaulting loans at the intermediate date (p
(1)
T ¸ pT;d), it can go with
a real appreciation at the end of the game.
We …rst have to check wether an increase in pN undermines banks’ incentives to roll over
poor projects. It can be written as
¢WT = (1 ¡ ®)(D
(2)
T;i ¡ L) ¡ (1 ¡ q
(2)
T;i)(D
(2)
T;i ¡ p
(2)
T;i) (18)
14The parameter ± is a synthetic one that incorporates the weight of non-tradable goods in the general prices
index.
17The derivative with respect to the price of the non-tradable good is
@(¢WT)
@pN
=
@qT
@pN
(D
(2)
T ¡ p
(2)
T ) +
@DT
@pN
(q(2) ¡ ®) + (1 ¡ q(2))
@pT
@pN
(19)
An increase in pN a¤ects the probability q(2) of repayment of a poor rolled over project through
a real appreciation; q
(2)
T is increasing in pN because it is assumed that ± < ±. Following the
preceding assumptions, the price of the tradable good p
(2)
T is also increasing in pN. It is the
same for …rms’ debt in tradable good D
(2)
T .
A rise of pN may urge banks with non performing tradable good loans in their portfolio to roll
over them because the probability of repayment of a rolled over project increases following the
real exchange rate appreciation (
@qT
@pN (D
(2)
T ¡p
(2)
T ) > 0) and the value of banks’ external debt rises
following the induced nominal depreciation ((1¡q(2))
@pT
@pN > 0; recall that if a bank chooses to roll
over defaulting loans, the expected value of its debt is lower than its face value). Furthermore,
the domestic currency return of a rolled over project rises with nominal depreciation. It will urge
banks to roll over poor projects if the probability of an end of game success is high enough with
respect to the proportion of good projects ®. This condition is directly linked to the importance
of real appreciation due to monetary softening, therefore related to ±. The overall expression is
non-negative, if one of these condition is satis…ed: q
(2)
T ¸ ® or, otherwise,
@q
@pN (D
(2)
T ¡p
(2)
T )+(1¡
q
(2)
T )
@pT
@pN ¸ @DT
@pN (® ¡ q
(2)
T ). We assume that one of these condition is satis…ed, that is monetary
softening does not de-incite banks to roll over defaulting loans.
Following our assumptions, if the government chooses to close banks, it can recover the value
of their external debt by forcing debtors into bankruptcy. Then, increasing the non-tradable good
price is not an issue. So, we focus on the consequences on the costs associated to forbearance.
If ± = ±, any increase in the price of the non-tradable good induces a nominal depreciation so
that there are no change in the real exchange rate de…ned as
pT
pN . It means no alteration in
the probability of success of rolled over poor projects, qT, but there is a mechanical increase in
the domestic currency value of banks’ external debt. Therefore, increasing pN is a dominated
strategy. If ± = 0, the rise of pN does not alter the nominal exchange rate; on the other hand,
there is a real appreciation that leads to an increase in qT. Therefore, the expected costs of a
strategy of forbearance decrease.
From the preceding discussion, it results that there exists a cut-o¤ level of ± 2
£
0;±
¤
, denoted
b ±, such that if ± > b ±, a rise of pN raises the expected costs of recapitalization and can not be
18an issue for the government. On the contrary, if ± · b ±, the government will increase pN since
the bene…ts of a higher probability of success of rolled over projects outweights the extra-cost
due to the increase of domestic currency external debt of banks. Then we de…ne a strategy
labelled “accommodating forbearance” as a strategy of forbearance together with an increase
in the price of the non-tradable good. Then, the condition for existence of a too many to fail
is altered. If c(m) · mRmin(pN), a too many to fail is not possible. According to Mitchell’s
analysis, there is no constraint on ex-ante monitoring activities. However, if (i) ± · b ± and (ii)
mRmin(pN) ¸ c(m) ¸ mRmin(pN), then a too many to fail is made possible by the government’s
capacity of lowering ex-post costs associated to a policy of forbearance through a real appreciation.
An ex-post policy of closure entails closure costs with certainty while leaving banks open
results in costs of recapitalization only if the rolled over projects fails. The government’s ability
to prompt a real appreciation allows it to lower this cost and makes forbearance more valuable.
Following Mitchell’s analysis, this constraints the possibility to implement ex-ante monitoring
capacity through a higher probability of facing a too many to fail.15 Note that this situation
is more likely to occur when the number of …nancially distressed banks is high.16 The basic
idea is that in Asian countries, despite of pressures on nominal exchange rates, the ongoing real
appreciation has contributed to preclude governments from being able to implement an e¢cient
prudential policy. It may have found expression in softening non-performing loans classi…cation
standards, loosening capital requirements or pursuing soft regulatory policies.
4 Concluding remarks
The example of Asian countries led us to investigate the …rms’ motivation to borrow in dol-
lar. Why did they choose to contract a (hard) foreign currency debt while depreciation (or
devaluation) is probable? We supply here an insurance-based explanation. Contracting a dollar
denominated loan may provide …rms with a higher probability of facing a soft budget constraint,
if their investment project is poor. A noticeable consequence of this analysis is that the higher
the proportion of poor projects in the economy, the more …rms will be prone to borrow in dollar.
However, …rms’ foreign currencies indebtedness goes hand in hand with a weakening of bank-
15See the appendix.
16Since for m = 0, costs associated to both policies are 0, and considering that c(m) is convex in m while R
min
is linear in m, this statement requires the assumption that the slope of c(m) in zero is lower than the one of R
min.
19ing system while the monetary institutions might be constrained in the regulatory/supervisory
policies they are able to implement.
The situation described above may be less likely to occur if the government considered a larger
objective function. First, it would take into account the weakening of the …nancial position of
sound banks (that is without non-performing loans in their portfolio) since there is an increase
in the domestic currency value of their external debt. Furthermore, it will take into account the
consequences of the real appreciation on the domestic tradable good sector. These consequences
depend on di¤erent and opposite e¤ects if we consider a traditional model of trade (see Gandolfo,
1998; chap 6). First, a revenue e¤ect can happen if the rise of pN induces an increase in domestic
demand of tradable goods (and if domestic producers bene…t from this increase in the demand).
Nevertheless, if we assume that producing one units of the tradable good requires a quantity x of
the non-tradable good, pro…tability of tradable good sector decreases. We should also note that
in a setting in which labor is a general factor moving freely from sector to sector, the increase
in pN the government prompts to cut its costs may impede a resource movement e¤ect from the
non-tradable to the tradable good sector (which may be ex-ante optimal if we solely consider
the initial increase in pT).
The approach developed in this paper could be extended to develop a dynamic analysis of
intermediated foreign currency loan, for example along the lines of models developed by Dekle
and Kletzer (2001) or Giannetti (2000).17 These authors propose models of the Asian crisis based
on a dynamic analysis of banks’ incentives to roll over defaulting loans. Yet they do not consider
the non-tradable good sector. It would require to take into account both …scal considerations
(since it determines the government ability to repay domestic depositors and foreign lenders),
the level of foreign exchange reserves and foreign lenders behavior. It would certainly allow us
to draw some interesting conclusions on the ability of the government both to prompt a real
appreciation and to implement a strict prudential policy.
5 Appendix
We present here a simpli…ed version of Mitchell’s analysis in order to show formally that the
possible occurrence of a too many to fail situation constrains the monitoring capacity the gov-
17Giannetti’s model does not rely on the assumption of deposit or foreign currency debt guarantee conversely
to Dekle and Kletzer analysis or to the present paper.
20ernment can implement ex-ante (for a complete analysis, see Mitchell, (1998)). There are m
banks with non-performing loans in their portfolio. The timing is as the one described above.
At t = 0, the government chooses a monitoring capacity, ´ 2 [0;1], and supports the cost H(´)
assumed to be convex in ´. At t = 1, banks observe the price of the tradable good, assumed to
be high enough to make a soft liquidation policy valuable. Then, they choose a liquidation policy
with respect to defaulting loans. The government monitors banks and apply an ex-post policy
to passive detected banks. At t = 2, poor rolled over projects are realized and the government
pays back foreign lenders if projects fail.
Because of the monitoring capacity, the total ex-post cost of a closure policy is C(´;m) =
H (´) + c(´m) + (1 ¡ ´)mRmin, where Rmin = (1 ¡ q)[pT ¡ ®DT]. The last term di¤ers from
Mitchell; it is justi…ed by the fact that at the end of the game, foreign lenders must be repaid
if non-terminated poor projects fail. Let suppose that (i) the bene…ts of detecting a small
number of banks exceeds the costs of closing these banks and (ii) at ´ = 0, the marginal cost
of monitoring does not outweight the net marginal bene…t of closing a small number of banks.
Note that the expected payo¤ of a passive banks is now (1 ¡ ´)qT(DT ¡ pT); moreover, if the
government apply a closure policy to passive detected banks, their payo¤ is zero. The total
cost of a recapitalization policy is R(´;m) = mRmin (if recapitalization is to be the optimal
ex-post strategy, the government does not implement any monitoring capacity since monitoring
is costly).
As Mitchell let state the following without proof. Denote by ´ the value of ´ 2 [0;´] such
that the …rst-order condition for minimization of C (´;m) is satis…ed. When the …rst order
condition is satis…ed
H0(´) +
@c(´m)
@´
¡mRmin = 0 (A.1)
The optimal value ´¤ given a policy of intervention will either be ´ or ´, where ´ represents a
corner solution (´ is high enough to make a soft liquidation policy not valuable for banks). In
the latter case,
H0(´) > mRmin ¡
@c(´m)
@´
(A.2)
and
H(´) < C(´;m) (A.3)
Consider …rst that the government expects that no collusion between banks. Because of assump-
tions (i) and (ii), ´ > 0 implies that the total ex-post costs of a closure policy are lower than
21total cost with ´ = 0. Since C(0;m) is equal to R(0;m), the total cost of a closure policy must
be lower than the total cost of a recapitalization policy. Then there exists an equilibrium with
´ > 0 and closure of passive detected banks (we do not address the case in which accommodating
forbearance is the preferred strategy ex-ante because of real appreciation).
Assume that the government wants to implement a high monitoring capacity (the corner
solution). A too many to fail occurs if the ex-post costs of closure are higher than ex-post costs
of recapitalization, that is if
c(´m) + (1 ¡ ´)mRmin ¸ mRmin (A.4)
or equivalently,
c(´m)
´
¸ Rmin (A.5)
Suppose that this condition is satis…ed, because of induced -valuable- real appreciation and
that the government expects that such an implicit collusion may occur. Then, there exists
an equilibrium with ´ and closure of detected passive banks. To check this, note that since
monitoring is costly
H(0) + mRmin < H(´) + mRmin (A.6)
where the last term stands for the costs of the government facing a too many to fail situation.
From the preceding, we know that
H(´) + c(´m) + (1 ¡´)mRmin < H(0) + mRmin (A.7)
Hence
H(´) + c(´m) + (1 ¡ ´)mRmin < H(´) + mRmin (A.8)
Then the equilibrium policy corresponds to a softening of prudential policy; the government
must …x a monitoring capacity equal to ´ instead of ´.
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